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 We empirically investigate the impact of liquidity framework 
proposed under Basel III, namely Net Stable Funding Ratio on Net 
Interest Margin for 385 banks in SAARC countries (Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka) along with five developed countries i.e. Australia, Canada, 
China, Japan and United State over 2003-2013. The NSFR in Basel 
III liquidity necessity intended to limit funding risk emerging from 
maturity conflicts between assets and liabilities of overall countries. 
The results indicate that there is also a gap between developing and 
developed countries to managing the stability of their funding 
source as well as liquidity of its assets is a benefit to them and is 
also transformed into net interest margin by comparison of 
developing and developed countries. In addition, this study also 
proved the findings of previous researches in developed countries 
that are relevant to bank determinants and net interest margin in the 
world. 
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1. Introduction  
When markets collapse, the plans paved into future can be demolished. As the economies are becoming 
increasingly globalized and mutually dependent hence the upshots of a banking crisis are transmittable 
away from the border of countries.The increase in cross-border trade along with the collapse of US 
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mortgage market 2007-2008 has demonstrated that financial globalization has advance in developing the 
sufficient global institutions with the objective to assist in managing globalization along with 
advancement of financial mechanisms (Stiglitz 2010, 151). As the upshot of recent financial market 
collapse 2007-2008 the banking regulation was refurbished, hence Basel III accord come into existence 
with an intention to be replaced by Basel II. By making amendments along with the requirements of 
capital Basel III, furthermorethere are two main funding’ standards including liquidity coverage (LCR) 
as well as net stable funding ratio (NSFR). In short, the first standard deals with inflexible control of 
short term liquidity but other standard seeks to overcome the problem of difference in maturity between 
assets and liabilities of the banks. 
 
The global financial crunch became a source of great turmoil for the banking institutions of developed 
countries. By making comparison among the collapses of global financial giants of developed 
economies, there was less number of bank crashes in developing economies. Hence, the emerging 
economies follow the catching up process of 2007-2008 global financial crises. This paper seeks to 
presents the first inclusive evaluation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and estimates the ratio for 
the developed and developing economies by making a sharp comparison. In this research study, various 
strategies are observed for those financial institutions whose value is less than the threshold level, thus 
to meet NSFR and assess about impact these changes bring on Net Interest Margin a financial 
institution. The financial crisis of 2007–2009 witnessed that in various countries the displacement of 
wholesale funding markets of banks was the core reason for the sufferance of shortages of liquidity. The 
financial institutions were unable to overturn their debts as they financed long-term assets with debt of 
short –term thus making these banks most exposed to risk (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013; Huang and 
Ratnovski, 2011; Afonso et al., 2011; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Gorton, 2009; Brunnermeier and 
Markus, 2009).  However, NSFR deal with funding risk and is devised to endorse structural amendments 
developing profiles of risks for banks attend to be more stable by funding in longer-term assets. Banks 
which do not meet the NSFR require condensing assets entailing stable funding along with an increase 
in sources of stable funding. This empirical study draws attention to the tradeoffs between liquidity 
reforms, financial institution risk and profitability by making comparison among developing and 
developed countries. The NSFR is devised to promote banks for holding more high-quality of liquid 
assets and use stable sources to boost its funding. Such changes will enhance the buoyancy of banks in 
the periods of stress. 
 
Preferably, micro-data is used by researchers to check the response of banks towards the Basel III 
liquidity requirements. Regrettably, still the data is not available not even for the national supervisors 
the data does not yet exist, even for national supervisors. So, we used bank scope data for the estimation 
of NSFR. 
 
However, the trade-off results in lower the profitability of financial institution. Interest income will be 
lowered if the smaller quantities of illiquid assets are pledged along with the more assets of high quality. 
Although, in case of financing assets with long-term liabilities will cause to boost in interest expense. 
Hence, the follow-on turns down in net interest income together with the rise in interest bearing assets 
will provide a basis for the decline in NIMs. Financial institutions compliances to BCBS advocate that 
liquidity constraints might negatively influence the business models as well as profitability of financial 
institutions. Concerning about the possible unintended outcomes, the NSFR implementation process 
have been delayed by the regulators until 2018. 
 
This paper presents the inclusive evaluation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). In this empirical 
study, we will delineate how NSFR is determined and ratio is estimated for the banks representing 5 
developed countries (Australia, Canada, China, Japan and United State) and 7 developing countries 
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(SAARC). For banks that are less the minimum threshold, we look for different strategies to meet the 
NSFR and assess the influence of these changes on bank net interest margins (NIMs). Further the 
comparison will be done between those developed and developing countries. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Generally, the concept of liquidity is three-fold; market liquidity, funding liquidity, and liquidity 
creation. Basically, the NSFR is proposed to target the funding liquidity issue by reducing funding risk 
take place due to mismatch between assets and liabilities, whereas the LCR deals with the liquidity risk 
by rising the number of bank holdings of high-quality including liquid assets. 
 
However, while citing an extensive amount of literature, Berger and Bouwman (2009) claims that as 
banks exist for the reason as they generate liquidity and convert risk1. Liquidity formation refers to the 
stipulation of financing to the real economy. By funding comparatively illiquid assets with liquid 
liabilities, financial institutions generate liquidity on balance sheet. In addition to this, banks give an 
access to other options of financing by using operations of off-balance sheet for-example: loan 
commitments. Transformation of risk is also involving in this process. Consequently, the role of liquidity 
creation and risk transformation cause banks susceptible to both risks funding as well as the liquidity. 
By summarizing the broad literature on these issues, Strahan (2010) concurs that composition of bank 
balance sheet along with their right to use liquidity of central bank, government guarantees allow it an 
extra ordinary benefit in controlling these risks. However, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 
reveals flaws in banks risk management techniques and calls for new set of reforms which results in the 
form of BASELIII.  
 
Although, The Basel III reforms may correspond to the foremost effort by international regulators to 
establish minimum liquidity standards (Standard & Poor’s, 2010), as the liquidity risk has long been the 
core reason in models of bank failure (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), in addition to regulation of capital 
and narrow banking studies (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) and in case of financial corruption (Allen and 
Gale, 2000). Whereas to avert deposit defaults, deposit insurance is broadly considered as one of the 
solution, as shown the defaults that take placed all through the latest crisis occurred in wholesale 
funding markets including federal funds (Afonso et al.,2011), interbank markets (Acharya and 
Merrouche, 2013), repomarkets (Gorton, 2009) or securitized markets (Brunnermeier, 2009). For the 
regulation of liquidity various banking models are suggested. Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue liquidity 
creation might be reduced due to capital regulation reforms and narrow banking structure. Indeed, 
Acharya et al. (2011) research provides a model with the propositions for bank liquidity options from 
different crisis decision rules.  
 
Even though interferences to determine banking crises takes place, however, liquidity support provided 
to botched banks or unconditional support to ongoing banks reduces motivations to hold liquidity. Yet 
again, liquidity reforms may alleviate the moral hazard dilemma other than with possible unintended up 
shots for the financial system. 
 
Literature surrounds capital regulations provides mixed views on either the regulatory reforms escort 
banks to increase risk taking. However, the models in theoretical studies of Hellmann et al. (2000), 
Jeitschko and Jeung (2007), Milne (2002), and Repullo (2004), surrounded by others, argue the 
propositions are not simple enough as they depend on the competition level. The empirical research 
work also reveals mix analysis. González (2005), for instance, come across that regulatory constraints 
boost banks’ risk-taking incentives by dropping their charter value, whilst Laeven and Levine (2009) 
claims that the relation is basically dependent on ownership structure of each bank. It can be concluded 
that the same regulation can give different outcome due to bank, industry or country features. 
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2.1  The Net Stable Funding Ratio 
The risk factor appears because of immaturity between assets and liabilities of the banks, Basel III 
requirement for liquidity is an innovative idea which suggested how to reduce the risk regarding funding 
of the banks. The ratio of available stable funding (ASF) to required stable funding of the financial 
institutions is termed as net stable funding ratio (NSFR). However, recognized funding  
However, established funding involves all structures regarding equity and liability funding likely being 
more reliable, as supply of funds throughout one-year that is subsequent the circumstances of prevalent 
financial straining. For determining ASF, 0 to 100% factor’s range is assigned to shape of liability and 
equity, then that percentages are multiplies to existing total groups as each and by summing up of 
combinations of these totals is the value of the ASF. The similar rule is followed for RSF in formula, 
according to rule every value is detained and finances through the funding institutions that is 
additionally multiplied by each group factor, when the weighted amount summation is the value of RSF. 
To increase the flexibility of the banking system, the Basel Committee introduced from July 2009 to 
December 2010 subsequent sequences of advancement is known as Basel III (BCBS, 2010b). The Basel 
Committee predicted two different standards for liquidity to deal with banks funding’ requirements, 
introduced by Northern Rock (BCBS, 2010a). 
The suggestions which published and observed in November 2009 early but this is released and 
customized in December 2010. In January 2013, the LCR standard and its schedule was reviewed but 
NSFR plans remained same (King, 2013). To raise need base funding of banks, the NSFR is a longer-
term structural ratio, which addresses funding risk. The balance sheet items are covered by NSFR and it 
also compels banks to fund long-term liquid assets with long-term capital. Limits can be provided to the 
Currency mismatches and cross-border funding risk by the assets given credit in the ratio.  The NSFR 
has not been personalized and the schedule for preliminary execution remains 1 January 2018 (King, 
2013). 
 
3. Data and Empirical Estimation 
This section states the source of data used in our study for the empirical investigation, we used annual 
reports of banks to collect variables’ data. We obtained data from financial statements and from Bank 
scope comprises, of commercial and investments banks for 11 years (2003-2013) for all calculation of 
variables. We took 5 developed countries (Australia, Canada, China, Japan and United State) and 
developing (SAARC) countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh and 
Nepal) but Afghanistan excluded due to political instability. In this study, we investigate to compare the 
impact of NSFR on net interest margin in the SAARC and developed countries by using this data. Our 
sample size for developed countries is 1814 in SAARC countries and 3410 in developed countries as 
well. We used STATA v.13.o. For all type of analysis on this database and showed below. 
 
3.1 Variables Measurement 
A commonly used measure of profitability is Net Interest Margin (NIM) which is a determined by the 
difference between the interest income produced by banks and the amount of interest paid out to their 
lenders (for example, deposits), relative to the amount of their (interest-earning) assets. In the first 
group, we usedbank specific factors i.e. funding stability (NSFR) explained as above, Operating 
Efficiency (COST) measure as operating expenses to total revenue, Capital Strength (EQUITY) 
calculated as total equity to total assets and Bank Size (SIZE) measure as log of total assets of the banks. 
In the second group, we used two determinants of macro-economic variables to examine the effect of 
environment on profitability of banks which are Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) growth and the 
inflation rate (INF) annually.  
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The econometric model is estimated using the following equation: 
NIM                                                            
where 
idenotes to an individual bank, t denotes to financial year, NIM (Net Interest Margin) is the dependent 
variables in this equation. α is the intercept of the regression model; NSFRit, COSTit, EQUITYit, and 
SIZEit are the bank specific determinants for bank in this study, RGDPjt and INFjt are the 
macroeconomic variables on year t, and εitis an error term in this equation. In this equation, i and t 
shows as a penal dataset in this model. 
 
3.2 Calculating the NSFR 
To deal with financial crisis period, the NSFR is developed to enhance the long-term flexibility by high 
availability of liquidity of banks. This standard requirement species to banks that there is stable funding 
for the arrangement of liabilities, assets and their off-balance sheets items. For the calculation of NSFR, 
is shown as under: 
 
     
                        
                       
 
 
There are two issues when calculating the NSFR. First, there are ambiguities in the guidelines of the 
Basel III accord which requires the use of judgment. Second, there are format and detail related gaps in 
the publicly available data that are required for the determination of the NSFR (Hong et al., 2014). 
Following the effort of King (2013), this made several assumptions regarding stable and less-stable 
categories for deposits and maturities among assets and liabilities. Below is the set of variables that we 
should compute ASFitandRSFitwith a brief description of each variable: 
 
      
*(          )  *(                )      +  *(            )      +  
*(           )      +-
,*(           )      +  *(                 )       
*(                           )      +  *(                   )      +-
 
 
The NSFR numerator measures that sources of Available Stable Funding (ASF), with greater weight 
given to sources that are at least likely to disappear under stressed market situations. Equity, longer-term 
wholesale funding as well as longer-term liabilities are the most stable forms of funding’, tracked by 
deposits and short-term wholesale funding maturing in less than one year. Interbank funding is not 
observed as a stable funding source and is given a 0% weight. The NSFR denominator shows a bank’s 
Required Stable Funding (RSF), with a factor (or haircut) based on an asset’s expected liquidation value 
under stressed conditions. Cash and securities with less than 1 year to maturity, and interbank claims do 
not have to be funded and have a factor of 0%. Qualifying government debt with a 0% risk-weight is 
considered highly liquid and must only be funded at 5% of face value. Corporate loans and retail loans 
that mature within 1 year must be funded 50% and 85%, respectively. Residential mortgages of any 
maturity as well as corporate loans greater than 1-year in maturity must be funded at 65%. All remaining 
assets must be funded at 100%. 
 
For data screening process, we appliedtwo types of diagnostics tests in which the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier (BPLM) test was firstly performed to decide either we should be used a random 
effects (RE) regression and pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) regression on data. The values of 
LM test statistics is 0.310 for NIM in developed countries and 0.153 for SAARC countries as dependent 
variables, these confirm the absence of random effect in the database and it also provide evidence that if 
we use random effect estimation, this is not suitable method to test the relationship. Then we applied 
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Hausman Test to test the fixed effect and random effect method to reject null hypothesis of random 
effect model which is ideal model for analysis in this study. This tells us two methods which are the 
POLS and Fixed Effect Regression to the relationship between bank specific determinants and 
profitability in this study.We used robust test for heteroscedasticity on this regression model in 
developing and developed countries model. The problem of heteroscedasticity can make the coefficient 
as insignificant in the regression model estimation. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics: 
The table 1 and 2 show the descriptive statistics of the study which indicate data normality test. The 
means value of each variable should be greater than its standard deviation. The mean value of the 
variables lies between 0.4975604≤ Mean ≤ 8.181748 in SAARC and 0.5155287≤ Mean ≤ 5.177132 of 
developed countries and these are positive values. The standard deviation of each variable is less than its 
mean value which shows the data is normally distributed. NIM standard deviations are 2.790729 and 
2.797408 which are less than its means of 4.26437, 4.258634 in SAARC and developed countries 
respectively. The minimum value of NIM is 1.11 and maximum value is 11.22 in overall sample. 
Wewinsorized all variables at 5% except RGDP and INF to remove the outliers from this database. 
Further details of descriptive statistics of other variables are given below: 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: SAARC Countries 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
NIM 1103 4.26437 2.790729 1.11 2.06 3.53 5.62 11.22 
NSFR 1133 0.926021 0.9073025 0 0.315633 0.59935 1.246575 3.386752 
COST 883 1.405391 1.134254 0.101351 0.580882 1.079268 1.912621 3.803921 
EQUITY 988 .4974604    .26818   .100000 .2163 .525 .694    .998 
SIZE 981 4.34E+00 9.01E-01 2.69E+00 3.58E+00 4.38E+00 5.09E+00 5.87E+00 
RGDP 1814 4.17E+11 5.06E+11 7.20E+08 3.10E+10 9.70E+10 9.10E+11 1.50E+12 
INF 1812 8.181748 3.492036 -18.1086 6.21765 7.80529 9.68505 22.5645 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Developed Countries 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
NIM 2042 4.258634 2.797408 1.11 2.13 3.42 5.73 11.22 
NSFR 1829 0.712014 0.7964847 0 0.184505 0.451146 0.882296 3.38675 
COST 2191 2.496181 2.145229 0.127907 0.778571 1.834483 3.634146 6.904762 
EQUITY 2342 .5155287 .1894453 .11 .3711 .5185   .64   .999 
SIZE 2341 5.177132 0.5620577 2.691159 4.807083 5.278998 5.633897 5.869927 
RGDP 3410 3.78E+12 1.43E+12 6.40E+11 2.90E+12 4.40E+12 4.60E+12 1.40E+13 
INF 3410 1.591484 2.030528 -1.34672 -0.00828 1.37349 2.77074 5.86438 
 
 
3.4 Correlation SAARC Countries 
The table 3 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients of the variables. The correlation tells about the 
relationship between two variables. According to results, if one-unit change in independent variable 
NSFR, the change will be there 1.06% and -4.74 in dependent variable NIM in SAARC and developed 
countries respectively. This correlation is very weak in both areas of the study because the funding 
regulations are not fully followed by the banks in them. There is negative correlation in developed at 1% 
level of significant in developed countries and positive relationship exist with NIM at 5% level of 
significant in SAARC. The table 3 also defines that COST, EQUITY, INF have positive correlation with 
the value of 4.43%, 1.59% and 1.93% respectively with NIM but there is negative correlation with SIZE 
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as well as RGDP with NIM at 5% level of significance in SAARC. In developed countries, there is 
greater correlation exist in banks specific factors and macro-economic variables. The table 4 explains 
that COST, EQUITY and INF have correlation of 2.77%, 2.45%, 0.33% respectively at the significance 
level of 5% but negative correlation is available in SIZE and RGDP with the value of 7.63% and 2.13 at 
10 as well as 5% level of significance respectively.  
 
 
Table 3: Correlation SAARC Countries 
Variable NIM NSFR COST EQUITY SIZE RGDP INF 
NIM 1       
NSFR 0.0106*** 1      
COST 0.0443** -0.0814* 1     
EQUITY 0.0159** -0.0289** -0.0397 1    
SIZE -0.0455** -0.1236 0.0144*** -0.5785 1   
RGDP -0.0335** -0.2072 0.0981* -0.3132 0.7134 1  
INF 0.0193** 0.0499** 0.0806* 0.1516 0.0217** 0.0354** 1 
Table 4: Correlation Developed Countries 
Variable NIM NSFR COST EQUITY SIZE RGDP INF 
NIM 1       
NSFR -0.0474** 1      
COST 0.0277** 0.0252** 1     
EQUITY 0.0245** -0.0701* -0.1024 1    
SIZE -0.0763* 0.0787* -0.1125 -0.4529 1   
RGDP -0.0213** 0.1257 0.0973* -0.0505* 0.0547** 1  
INF 0.0033*** -0.1143 -0.2838 0.2576 -0.2278 -0.3162* 1 
0.10<p * 0.05,<p ** 0.01,<p ***  
4.  Regression Results 
Based on the result of OLS regression explained in Table 5, the NSFR have negative effect on banks 
profitability in developed countries and it is significant. This result suggested that the BASEL III 
requirements of stable fundings have negative connection with profitability of the banks in developed 
countries but there is positive association with profitability in SAARC, this study is consistent with 
Jiraporn et al., (2014). Operating efficiency have positive relationship with NIM but it is insignificant in 
both regions, that show high level of cost efficiency leads to high profitability of the banks. These 
findings are confirmed with Hong et al., (2014).  The capital strength is positively associated with banks 
performance in SAARC that confirms the study of Mohd Said, (2014) but negative association in the 
bank’s profitability of developed countries. The coefficient of the SIZE indicates the positive 
relationship with profitability of the banks but it is insignificant in SAARC. This validates the ‘toobig to 
fail’ phenomena wherein larger banks are more profitablerisk-management tools as contended by 
Hankenes and Schnabel(2011). In the developed countries, there is negative association with 
profitability which show big banks are less profitable as compare to small banks. Finally, both 
estimations show that the effect of macroeconomic factors on profitability is not significant except 
RGDP in SAARC and hence do not provide support to the argument of positive association between 
macroeconomic conditions and financial sectors performance which is consistent with the findings of 
Dietrich et. al (2010). The table 5 also shows the coefficient of determination which is 2.8% in SAARC 
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and 1.70% in developed countries. The developed economies are more involved in BASEL III 
requirement as compare to developing economies so that the results show more coefficient of 
determination in developed countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The 2007-08 financial market crises that started with the crash of the subprime mortgage led to the turn 
down in solvency of the banking system in the United States. This has pinched to propose Basel III by 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which applied tough rules and regulations for banks 
to meet the liquidity. Net Stable Funding Ratio is anticipated to have best performance and a stable way 
of funding. This helps to banks that focus instead on high quality assets but to retire from investing in 
low as well as medium quality assets that maintain the banks’ profitability. 
 
The finding of the study through analysis that NSFR does have negative association on NIM but it is 
significant in developed countries and positively insignificant effect in SAARC. Hereafter, the banks 
having sufficient stable funding as compare to required stable funding, get the benefit of financial 
profitability in developed economies. In short, our estimations valid the BASEL III stable funding 
regulations and NSFR as a ratio of stable funding have an ability to enhance the bank’s profitability in 
developed countries as compare to SAARC.Other explanatory variable COST, EQUITY and SIZE have 
positive impact on bank profitability in developing countries but COST have positive impact on bank 
profitability and EQUITY as well as SIZE have negative impact on bank profitability in developed 
Table 5: The Impact of NSFR on Net Interest Margin 
Dependent Variable: NIM 
 (SAARC) (Developed) 
VARIABLES NIM NIM 
   
NSFR 0.244 -0.310** 
 (0.209) (0.147) 
COST 0.106 0.0279 
 (0.0866) (0.0364) 
EQUITY 0.00263 -0.0371 
 (0.0337) (0.0399) 
SIZE 0.168 -0.494** 
 (0.283) (0.227) 
RGDP  -1.58e-14 ** -3.80e-14 
 (7.78e-14) (-0.54) 
INF 0.0174 -0.0813 
 (0.0605) (0.0585) 
   
Constant 3.582** 7.320*** 
 (1.447) (1.377) 
   
P Value 
Observations 
0.215 
343 
0.035 
777 
R-squared 0.028 0.017 
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countries because they follow Basel III very strictly. These results met the expectation of the NSFR-
Profit link in developed countries as compare to developing countries. Overall results showed, it is 
evidence that the regulations made in Basel III by central banks as an outcome of the 1997-98 Asian 
financial that increase the profitability of Malaysian Banks (Commercial). While, this study provides 
insights of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) in SAARC countries as well as developed countries 
and their implication of new liquidity model set by the Basel III.  
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